In trying to understand the Impact of the Internet, the fundamental charge of the Berlgund Center for Internet Studies at Pacific University, Alan Greenspan has been an unavoidable figure.
We have invoked his name repeatedly in our analyses. [ which we now live cannot really be understood. To Greenspan, understanding requires a complete availability of information, primarily statistical. But one of the great puzzles in the last decade or so of the American economy has been the nature of the relationship between the Internet, productivity and economic growth. [4] Greenspan has discussed the issue at various times, but The Age of Turbulence both gives him an opportunity to sum things up at length, and perhaps requires as well that he does so, in an effort to demonstrate his own understanding of the present era.
Greenspan first had to confront the Internet as an economic force in 1994, when he served at the Federal Reserve and as frequent advisor to the incoming Clinton administration. Greenspan and others were at that time "puzzling out the so-called New Economy". Greenspan saw this period as dominated by the impacts of the "dual forces" of information technology and globalization.
[5]
By August of 1995, the Dot.com boom was beginning. Greenspan saw this era as inaugurating a historic shift, a period of "creative destruction" caused by technological change, of the sort that occurred no more than perhaps every fifty or one hundred years.
[6]
But precisely why information technology should have this transformational effect is, in Greenspan's recounting, somewhat murky or at least it resulted from a variety of different effects, which he does not parse out. Primarily, however, he believes it to be due to a muchenhanced ability for business to collect and disseminate information. [7] This permits business to better manage uncertainty, a key obstacle to making improvement. This analysis illuminated for Greenspan the "primary riddle of the technology boom: the question of productivity." [8]
What Greenspan saw, however, as a historic but necessarily limited effect of investments in information technology, others saw as a sign that the economy itself had changed; business cycles [9] were irrelevant, and the sky was apparently the limit, at least for the stock market.
This boom was slowed, in part, by Greenspan's pronouncement that it had become "irrationally exuberant", but despite the .com crash, economic growth continued, albeit at a reduced pace.
By 1999, despite the Asian Contagion and problems with the Russian economy, globalization seemed to be spreading economic progress on an international scale. Partly, this was due once again to the Internet. The Internet provided new ways to move information and resources, including fiscal ones, quickly and broadly.
Greenspan, however, began to worry that the Internet-enabled international economy was becoming too complicated, or at least mutated too rapidly, to understand. Enter the Age of Turbulence-the 21st century.
Greenspan initially saw the advent of the Bush administration as an opportunity to enshrine proper economic policies across the board. He soon learned, however, that the administration Also like Rand, Greenspan's model of appropriate economic policy comes largely from a very particular view of human nature, which many, including me, find sadly limited. This human nature is, to Greenspan, independent of time, place or culture. [14] Human nature is, he believes, driven by our desire for self-esteem, dependent upon the approval of others. This determines how we spend our money. But human nature presents a particular challenge to an economist who believes that predictability comes from econometric models and statistics-it may oscillate between the poles of "irrational" exuberance and fear, even, in the economic sense of the term, "panic".
If our natures are fairly similar and determinative, our natural endowments are, however, not.
Some of us, Greenspan observes, are more intelligent than others, and the intelligent will naturally garner more of the rewards of economic activity than others. In the entire book, one Greenspan's carefree Market Capitalism is viewed essentially as an autonomic process with its largely unexamined credo that a rising tide raises all boats, or that at the least the losers were simply too dumb to learn to swim. [16] He is aware that greed exists and uses the term occasionally in the text, though he never defines it. Neither is it found in the otherwise very useful and voluminous index, where, had it been included, it would have come after "Great Society" and before "Greenspan, Alan."
Despite, however, the above lacunae, there are many reasons for reading The Age of Turbulence. It is the biography of a major political and intellectual figure with broad direct experience in American life. His criticisms of the policies of the Bush administration, for example, are still making headlines across the world, months after they first appeared. [17] Greenspan is also a historian of the U.S. economy in that he closely ties recent economic issues to their roots in the past. The work can be read, then, as a history of the economy by the ultimate insider, the man who so strongly influenced it.
Greenspan also discusses some of the key events of our time as they impacted the American economy. Examples include globalization, the rise of China, and the impact of the Internet. It is this latter factor that drew us to the book, but at the last, we know little more about the relationship between the Internet and economic progress than we did before the book was published.
The Age of Turbulence does reinforce our awareness that Greenspan believes that the Internet increased productivity, but leaves us frustratingly distant from the sort of proof that Greenspan himself believes critical to good policy. Like the Internet itself, we seem to descend all too frequently into chaos.
